Mearshimer & Walt: The Questions They Never Asked

Everybody's favorite academic realists turned anti-Israel polemicists are back. Mearshimer and Walt's book-length expansion of their infamous "Israel Lobby" hits the stores next week. As a result, we will soon see, both in print and in the blogosphere, a rehash of the original debates that surrounded the publication of the article along with a phony debate over whether the book "fixes" the various flaws exposed by M&W's critics.

The initial reports are, with the exception of addressing the gaping hole that resulted from the near total absence of Christian Zionism in the original , the book essential duplicates the original argument. And while the various factual inaccuracies that have been pointed out help clarify that M&W had long left the province of rigorous academic thought, it is the fundamental flaws in the structure of the argument itself that exposed the original for the fraud that it was. Which means that for the book to indeed "fix" what was wrong in the original, it has a massive reconstruction project that M&W based on their post-article martyr tour have no intention of undertaking.

M&W's original article had essentially three elements. First, M&W asserted that there is a disconnect between US policy towards Israel and more broadly in the Middle East and the US's strategic interests. Second, M&W argued that this disconnect is due to the power and influence of the "Israel Lobby." Third, M&W purports to describe how the "Lobby" effects the disconnect between US interests and policies.

M&W gave their paper all the trapping of legitimate scholarship - a myriad of footnotes and a dry, dispassionate tone. What they did not provide, however, was rigor. If M&W were truly interested in examining the issues they posed in their paper, rather than backfilling an argument to a conclusion they had already reached, they would have had to have asked and answered the following questions:

(1) Is there in fact a disconnect between US policy towards Israel and the Middle East & US strategic interests?

This is of course the question that M&W seem best qualified to address given their past scholarship and credentials. Whatever one thinks of the merits of a rigorous Realist analysis, one would expect M&W to construct one, providing a detailed and nuanced cost-benefit analysis from a realist perspective of the American-Israeli "special relationship."

Instead, M&W treat the foundation stone of their argument as self-evident. They make a cursory argument regarding the diminution of Israel's value after the Cold War. However, the rest of this section, which discusses the liabilities that the US-Israel partnership imposes on the US's relationships with the other regimes in the region, relies mainly on a recitation of self-serving statements of Arab political elites without further analysis.

The reason M&W view the cost-benefit analysis of the current US-Israel relationship to be so self-evidently negative is that included at the heart of this analysis is an assumption that the large cost of the Iraq war should be attributed to the US- Israel relationship. Most of the criticism of the claim that the Israel Lobby led ths US into Iraq has focused on the conspiratorial and latently anti-Semitic aspects of it. But the dubiousness of the Israel-Iraq link is equally damning to M&W's substantive analysis. If the true costs of the US-Israeli relationship are limited to lucrative aid packages and peeved oil barons, then it is impossible to construct a Realist analysis that results in these costs overwhelming the benefits provided by the strategic US-Israeli partnership.

(2) Are there other reasons (besides the Israel Lobby) that explain this disconnect?

The obvious factors to look at here overlap but are essentially ideological and political - the moral claims of the Israeli position and the cultural affinity of the two nations. (The very idea that moral concerns lay outside our strategic interests is itself problematic, but at least consistent with "realist" doctrine.) These factors could either move elite or public opinion towards Israel and away from the "correct" policy that would result from a "dispassionate" Realist analysis.

In an odd move for a pair of Realists, the only attention given to this question is lengthy, scatter-shot attempt to rebut the moral case for Israel. This consists mainly of stringing together various tropes of anti-Israel propaganda and concluding that any tension between strategic necessity and moral principle is illusory. This entire exercise is a fraud, because M&W would reject the notion that even if the moral scorecard came out differently the result should be different.

What M&W do not however shed any light on the critical factor of public opinion. They do not answer the question of whether US's Israel policy is out of line not only with how American's should see US interests (if we were fortunate enough to be ruled by an American Bismarck), but how Americans actually view US interests.

Moving onto the M&W section on how the Israel Lobby purportedly functions, you would expect an analysis of the following:

(3) How do foreign policy lobbies function?

A scholarly article would properly set the Israel Lobby in context. How effective are foreign policy lobbies, domestic and foreign, at shifting U.S. policies? Does this salience of the issue reduce the impact of lobbies? For example, the anti-Castro Cuban emigrant lobby has traditionally had a stranglehold over our Cuba policy, an issue that most Americans are wholly indiffirent towards. M&W are proposing that the Israel Lobby is strong enough not only to steer low profile military aid packages Israel's direction, but to drag America into full-scale armed conflict. It would help in evaluating the feasibility of this claim if there is any historical precedent supporting it.

(4) Are there other foreign policy lobbies shaping our policy towards Israel and Middle East?

Similarly, a scholarly article would address the various other interests that compete to shape American Middle East policy - military contractors, domestic oil companies, trans-national corporations, the Saudis and other oil exporters, etc. M&W show absolutely no interest in these countervailing factors. To some extent, M&W avoid this area because it is far outside their realm of expertise. But another reason for the absence is that these lobbies all reinforce the Hamiltonian Realist agenda, which sees securing strategic resources and promoting American corporate interests as twin pillars of American foreign policy goals.

(5) What are the Israel Lobby's goals? What have been its greatest successes and failures?

You would think that this question would be at the heart of any genuine analysis of the "Israel Lobby's" power and influence. M&W have a unfocused discussion about the goals of securing the West Bank and preserving Israeli military hegemony. Additionally, M&W make much out of AIPAC's influence in a handful of Congressional elections. Yet, amazingly M&W do not even begin to touch on the high-profile showdowns between U.S. administrations and Israel during the past 30 years, or the success or failure of pro-Israel advocates in shifting American policy. There is absolutely no analysis of the First Lebanon war, the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, the Bush/Baker-Shamir showdown over settlement expansion or the Clinton administration's hands-on supervision of the Oslo process.

(6) Who is the Israel Lobby? What is the relationship between the Israel Lobby and American Jews?

M&W's failure to examine what the Israel Lobby has and has not achieved is connected intimately with their failure to clearly define exactly who the "Israel Lobby" is. On the one hand, it is relatively straightforward challenge to document AIPAC's successes and failures. On the other hand, once the "Israel Lobby" is expanded to an amorphous group that includes all American Jews with warm feelings towards Israel, any honest analysis would expose the competing jumble of contradictory viewpoints and agendas of such a group.

M&W appear to be trapped by the backfilling nature of their argument, which is designed to ultimately reach the Iraq war. However, neither AIPAC nor Israel were at the front of the line beating the drums for war with Iraq. The case for blaming Israel for the Iraq debacle requires tabbing various neocons in the Bush administration as agents of the Israel Lobby. But putting aside the quite laughable assertion that Cheney, Bush and Rumsfeld were less powerful than Feith, Perle and Wolfowitz, there is the serious problem that the neocon agenda frequently differed from that of the formal pro-Israel Lobbies, let alone that of the Zionist liberals who had previously embraced the Oslo process.

Mearshimer and Walt thus fail to seriously ask let alone answer any of the questions that would need in order to undertake a serious academic study of the impact of pro-Israel lobbies on American foreign policy. The result was an article that relied on innuendo, conspiracy and polemic to fill in its gaping logical and analytic holes. A mere tweaking or expansion of the article (e.g. sprinkling in a chapter on Christian Zionism or expanding the polemic to US-Syrian relations) can't possibly salvage the book as a serious work of scholarship. Unfortunately, these "fixes" will be enough to sell many copies to an audience that either doesn't know what scholarly analysis looks like or doesn't care.

Progressive Jews: Lifting Up the Prophetic Voice in a Time of Propoganda

The AJC's essay on Progressive Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism has provoked an intense debate in the American Jewish community. Rosenfeld's paper has its flaws, the most serious one being its conflation of virulent anti-Zionism with more benign a-Zionist navel gazing. However, the essay's core insight regarding the dangers of anti-Zionist rhetoric and hyperbolic criticism of progressive Jews in the context of the recent wave of anti-Semitism is fundamentally correct. With a few notable exceptions (Gershom Gorenberg in particular) the response of progressive Jews has been universally dismissive. The AJC is charged with trying to silence "all criticism" of Israel by equating it with anti-Semitism. The charge is wholly unfounded. Rosenfeld's principal targets in the essay criticize Israel's legitimacy, not its policies. But his sloppiness leads his endorsement of debate over Israeli policies to ring hollow and pro forma.


The AJC paper raises a particular dilemma faced by Justice-seeking Jews – how to maintain faith with the universalistic, prophetic elements of Judaism while avoiding the providing of rhetorical cover for the new anti-Semitism. For genuinely progressive Jews (as opposed to leftists who claim their Jewish ancestry when convenient for rhetorical purposes), the prophetic imperative is central to our identity. The Jewish people are chosen (whether by G-d or through their unique historical experience) for the task of tikkun olam (repairing the world). We are made holy through our righteousness. The Jewish state therefore should be more than merely a state like any other, it should be an or l'goyim (light unto the nations).


Accordingly, justice-seeking Jews are compelled to point out where Israel has missed the mark. The widening gap between rich and poor, the neglect of the environment and rampant corruption are all blights. The discriminatory short-changing of budgetary resources for Israel's Arab citizens is a travesty. Moreover, Israel's fighting of its just war of self-defense is not without blemish. The occupation of the West Bank is corrosive. There is acquiesence to settlement expansion and degradation of Palestinian civilians that is untethered to Israel's security needs. These problems are all pressing, and cannot wait for the resolution Israel's security problems or the emergence of the Arab and Islamic worlds from their current state of dysfunction. This too, is a requirement of the prophetic imperative – the time for righteousness is always now, not in some messianic future.

And yet, Israel is in a war in which its enemies seek not merely its retreat, but its elimination. Israel's enemies understand the modern battlefield, and they have conducted a ideological offensive to complement the spasms of terror that for now is all they can marshal against Israel. This propaganda campaign seeks to de-legitimize Jewish sovereignity and to legitimize the killing of Jews as valid response to the "crimes" of Zionism. Anti-Zionist propaganda exploits progressive biases by the selective embrace and cooption of liberal and progressive values. Anti-Zionists do not stop with attacking Israel, but cleverly train their rhetorical fire on Diaspora Zionists as well.

Progressive Jews are particularly susceptible to the themes of anti-Zionist propaganda. In particular, they are highly supceptible to what Richard Landes has brilliantly termed as Masochistic Omnipotence Syndrome - "it is all our fault; and if we can only be better, we can fix anything/everything." This is after all, what the prophetic tradition teaches us - that we as Jews are to focus on our failings, our failure to live up to our high moral standards. Yet, as Landes aptly notes such self-criticism "leads to a kind of self-absorption in which one loses any sense of the other side of any conflict." The result is a prophetic narcissism - criticism of Israel without context in the name of meeting the moral perfectionist needs of the progressive Jews, rather than seeking a just solution to the conflict. This one-sided focus on the sins of the Jewish state meshes perfectly with anti-Zionist narratives. The words of progressive Jews are wielded as tools to convince non-Jewish progressives to opppose Israel.

Right-wing Zionists, such as Morton Klein of the ZOA, would take the last point to a logical,extreme conclusion - because any criticism of Israel could play into the hand of anti-Zionists, no public criticism (except that of insufficient hawkishness) by American Jews is warranted. This, however, is simply an unacceptable answer for a progressive Zionist. If Israel can survive the intense, lively internal debate regarding its policies and values, it can surely survive participation in these debates by concerned Diaspora Jews. The following are some guidelines for how to think about responsible criticism of Israel.

Anti-Zionism Is Out of Bounds

This is a pretty easy red line to follow. Now is simply not the time to debate the merits of a Jewish state. Perhaps in some distant post-nationalist future where anti-Semitism in the Diaspora is a distant memory the merits of the Zionist project can be debated, but in the here and now the elimination of Jewish state will cost the lives of far too many Jews.
This does not rule out a-Zionist (or for the semantically challenged "post-Zionist") navel gazing – progressive Jews should feel free to talk all they want about how Israel doesn't "speak" to them.

Avoid Anti-Zionist Buzzwords

The prophetic voice lends itself to hyperbole, especially in the face of inertia. The problem is that when progressive Jews channel their inner Jeremiah – excoriating Israel's failings in the sharpest possible language they wind up repeating anti-Zionist talking points. Terms like "Nazi" and "apartheid" draw inapt comparisons and their value for shock effect and hyperbolic intensity is outweighed by the harm. The "Nazis" represent the highest form of evil and the greatest threat to civilization in modern times. A state that engages in "Nazi" policies is one that should be eliminated. Similarly, an "apartheid" regime that is constructed around racism, and therefore should be an international pariah. There are accurate ways to condemn the vices of Israeli policies without resorting to language that denotes Israel as beyond redemption.

Fight Both Fronts With Equal Passion

Progressive Jews should be just as willing to face the wrath of progressives by denying dishonest tropes about Israel as they are willing to face the anger of other Zionists by speaking unpleasant truths about Israel. Taking a "no enemies to the left" stance results in progressive Jews staying silent in front of slanderous attacks on Israel and other Jews. The alleged imbalance of power between right-wing Zionists and anti-Zionists is not only myopic given the strength of anti-Zionism outside Jewish circles and the United States, but also an abdication of responsibility.

Commit to Intellectual Honesty

Similarly, progressive Jews need to be intellectually honest in their criticism. This means acknowledging facts that exculpate Israeli actions as much as those which incriminate them, regardless of whether these fact facts support right-wing Zionist narratives. In particular, progressive Jews need to self-diagnose for Masochistic Omniopotence Syndrome - to acknowledge the limitations of Jews and Israel in unilaterally making peace. (Camp David revisionism is a particularly egregious example - progressive Jews would much rather uncritically adopt Palestinian spin on the talks than deal with the serious obstacles to peace raised by Fatah's strategic decision to respond to Barak's offer with violence.)

Have Some Humility

Unlike Amos or Isaiah, modern progressive Jews don't have direct Divine guidance when we engage in prophetic rhetoric. Just as the Israelis making policy are falliable in their judgment so are the critics of these policies. The command to pursue justice is blindingly obvious, but the route there is not always clear.

Zagat's for Shuls

For all the problems with market-driven Judaism, there is one major benefit - it keeps synagogues and other institutions accountable to the needs of their members. I've often joked that given American Jews different tastes and preferences, what is really needed is a Zagat's guide for shuls, to help guide the serious shul shopper.


So, I can only say that the latest idea from the fertile mind of Mobius, Shul Shopper is genius:


Imagine the possible reviews:


Temple Beth Suburb (Services: 15, Facilities: 25, Programming: 17)

Congregants "dressed to the nines" flock to this stately, large, Conservative synagogue known for its "erudite rabbi" and "golden-tongued cantor." If your mind wanders during Musaf, there is plenty to gaze at in the spectacular stained-glass windows of the sanctuary or the brilliant Judaica collection in the lobby. The prized Speakers Series features a literal who's who's of American Jewry, capped by an annual lecture in which Alan Dershowitz presents his latest book. Critics claim that the davening lacks ruach, that the Hebrew school is a "soulless, Bar Mitzvah factory" and "good luck finding a kosher kitchen outside of the shul."


Minyan Meah Achuz (Services: 28, Facilities: 12, Programming: 25)

What began a traditonal egalitarian minyan is now considered to be "one of the most dynamic communities in America." Meah Achuz feauturs spirited prayer led with hauting melodies sung in 6-part harmony, lunch and learns from rising rabbinic stars and holiday programs with overflowing attendance. While the church basement decor is "not much to look at," survey applicants say the exact opposite about the "hip, attractive" 20 and 30-something crowd. Dissenters kvetch "if you don't know the service well, you'll get lost real quick" and snark "not everybody went to an Ivy League School - some of them went to Wesleyan and Duke..."

Any similarities to actual congregations are fully intentional.

Post-Post-Zionism

I don't get Post-Zionism. Its the not that the concept is difficult to wrap my head around. The idea is quite simple - that a Jewish state in Israel is no longer necessary or desirable. When I was first exposed to Post-Zionism, in Israel during the heady days of Oslo, it had a logic to it; it was wrong, but at least it made theoretical sense. Jewish nationalism after all would be an anachronism in a New Middle East, where Jews and Arabs lived together in peace, harmony. and hummus. Israeli post-Zionism in the Oslo era came from secular Israelis' ennui with living in the Jew among the nations. Post-Zionism was the desperate plea of Sheinkin Street for normalcy, for the sunshine of the Tel Aviv midrachov to escape from the dark shadow of the Judean hills.

But the latest wave of self-professed Post-Zionists are primarily progressive American Jews. The term, like many monikers employing "post" is embraced as an emblem of generational pride. It is a cry of disastified Hebrew School alumni who found the three pillar Holocaust, Israel, Federation model of civic American Judaism uninspired (not to mention the spiritual deadness of rote Bar-Mitzvah drilling.) I empathise with their plight. How could any of us not emerged at least "post-" something from that experience. I myself, came out post-denominational - I highly recommend it.

But those who would purport to claim that they've moved "beyond" Zionism, have the obligation of at least weaving a narrative of how Zionism became obsolete. The Sheinkin Street post-Zionists had such a narrative. Israel was created to provide Jews with a safe haven so that they could pursue a normal life (to the extent Aviv Geffen can be considered "normal") like anyone else. Imminent peace with its Arab neighbors meant that Zionism had accomplished its goal. Israel could now progress to being a state of all its citizens - allowing for an Israeli identity distinct from its Jewish roots. The problem with Olso post-Zionism was that Oslo proved to be a chimera. Peace was not just around the corner; rather what was around the corner terror campaign waged against the very symbols of normalcy of the post-Zionist dream: pizza parlors, cafes and university cafeterias.

The young American post-Zionists (or purely for the purpose of coining a gratuitous acronyms, YAPZ) don't speak of a messianic New Middle East. Rather, the YAPZ speak of the messiness of Zionism and their personal dillusionment with it. YAPZ are discomforted by the excesses of Jewish nationalism, indeed with the idea of a nationalism itself. They recoil at what fee as pressure to conform to the party line from the mainstream American Jewish community. YAPZ reject the idea that secular Jewish culture should be centered in Israel; rejecting a negation of the cultural Diaspora as much as they do the negation of the political Diaspora.

What YAPZ do not however, is provide a coherent narrative of the obsolescence of Zionism. Certainly, there is value in reclaiming Yiddish culture, but the idea that Israel has ceased to be an incubator of Jewish cultural creativity is absurd. One might not like all of the ideas emanating from Israel, but it remains a fertile source for Jewish evolution, if for no other reason than the sharp contrast it provides with American Jewish life. The concept that Israel has fulfilled its political mission - and that the Jewish people will be more secure should Israel lose its Jewish status runs headlong into present realities of Arab politics and the long historical track record of the Jewish Diaspora.

So, all of passionate arguments of the YAPZ reject not Zionism itself, but rather the childish, emotive brand that spoke to American Jews in the 1960s and 1970s - Boomer Zionism. But rather than replacing the childish Zionism of their parents with a mature, nuanced Zionism, YAPZ have turned to adolescent rebellion in choosing to identify themselves as "beyond" or indifferent to the Zionist project.

In reality the majority of these self-proclaimed Post Zionists are simply Zionists who oppose expansion of the settlements, or Zionists who believe Palestinian rights deserve more consideration, or Zionists who believe that American Jews should be able to criticize Israeli politics, or Zionists who prefer to listen to neo-klezmer than Sarit Hadad.

Above all these, bright, passionate, progressive American Jews need to see that it is time to stop rebelling against an Zionism they are embarrased by and time to start building a Zionism they can embrace.

Marginalizing or Mainstreaming Jewish Anti-Zionism

The AJC, the Brookings Institute of the American Jewish community, has recently published a controversial new report by Alvin H. Rosenfeld, "Progressive Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism", which essentially charges certain left-wing Jewish thinkers with giving "aid and comfort" to the anti-Semites. The targets of the reports range from explicit Jewish anti-Zionists such as Noam Chomsky and NYU professor Tony Judt to progressive Jewish writers such as Douglass Rushkoff and Daniel Boyarin, whose relationship with Israel is far more ambivalent.

Mobius, the creator of the progressive Jewish blog Jewschool, attacked the report in one of his trademark blistering blog posts and again in a radio interview on the show "Beyond the Pale".

...[T]here is no safe space for legitimate criticism of Israel within the Jewish community itself. Those who question Israeli policies are hastily isolated, demonized, marginalized and excluded. The resentment of this treatment frequently results in movement towards the farthest fringes of the discourse and the adoption of a tarnished impression of the Jewish community.

At one level, Mobius is correct. The goal of the AJC report is precisely to ensure that certain views about Israel that are prominent among progressives remain marginal in American Jewish discourse. Rosenfeld does so by linking these views to anti-Semitism. Mobius, however, muddies the water a bit in his attack. Surely, anti-Zionists such as Chomsky and Judt are not merely "questioning Israeli policies." They are questioning the very existence of the state of Israel.

It is precisely this blurring of the line between Jewish anti-Zionism and other progressive Jewish criticism of Israel that is most serious problem with the Rosenfeld report. The report notes the dangers of hyberbolic rhetoric by Jews criticizing Israel; yet certainly some of this rhetoric comes from Progressive Zionists, who are seeking to reform the Jewish State rather than erase it. Similarly, a writer like Douglass Rushkoff, who finds difficultly idenitifying with Israel and finds meaning in univeraslist elements of the Jewish tradition, is best characterized as a-Zionist or ambi-Zionist. Rosenfeld paints with too broad a brush.

This lack of clarity, however, is not at the heart of Mobius' problem with the AJC and mainstream American Jewish community. Rather Mobius' main issue is that "opposing Jewish statehood for ethical, moral or religious reasons, or criticizing Israel for those reasons, is defined as antisemitic." In other words, Mobius objects to the effort to marginalize all progressive Jewish voices critical of Israel, including the anti-Zionists.

The question, therefore, is should anti-Zionism be mainstreamed in American Jewish discourse, invited back from the sidelines, where it has been banished since the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel. I believe it should not, for two reasons.

First, there is some merit to Rosenfeld's claim that Jewish anti-Zionism feeds into and abets anti-Semitism masquerading as anti-Zionism. There are certainly non anti-Semitic variants of anti-Zionism. Tony Judt, for example, appears to be motivated by a genuine post-nationalism prevalent in many European intellectuals. Similarly, there are academic arguments to be as to whether Zionism was the best solution to the "Jewish Question" in the 20th Century; but what is done is done, the overwhelming majority of the world's Jews outside North America have been gathered into the historic Jewish homeland. The idea of peaceful, stable, binational state given the current state of the Arab world is farcical. There is no end to a Jewish state in Israel that will not lead to tremendous Jewish suffering. Even those progressives who are ambivalent with the idea of Israel need to honestly address the reality of Israel.

Moreover, the "new anti-Semitism" described by the AJC is not a Zionist propaganda construction. There is a virulent rise in Jew-hatred, most significantly from radical Islam, that uses opposition to Israel as a front. The careful academic parsing of anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism pales in the face of the blood libels played on Arab state television or the cartoons that pass for "political commentary" in Arab or Iranian newspapers. This is true engine of anti-Zionism in the world today, in which arguments against nationalism, ethnocentrism, and human right violations are focused solely on one nation - which is not coincidentally the Jewish nation.

Second, progresisve Jewish support and even tolerance of anti-Zionism is a disaster for Progressive Zionism. It blurs the line between criticism of Israeli policies and Israel itself.
It plays right into right-wing Zionists who dismiss all criticism of Israel as masking an agenda to destroy Israel. It saps energy away from those Diaspora Jews such as the New Israel Fund whose vision of Israel as a "light unto nations" runs counter to the American Jews who support the competing visions of the settlers and the haredim. Progressive Zionism acknowledges that Israel is imperfect, that Jewish nationalism - like all nationalism - is problematic, that there is a moral cost to assuring the security and freedom of the Jewish people.

Given the reality of the world today, anti-Zionism remains a dangerous idea, one that is rightly marginalized in the American Jewish community. However, considering the major problems facing Israel, external and internal, physical, moral and spiritual, the need for a vigorous Progressive Zionism has never been greater.

The Rap on Conservative Judaism

In his farewell address at JTS, outgoing chancellor Ismar Schorsch stepped to the plate to deliver a blistering critique on the current state of Conservative Movement. Finally set free from the constraints of institutional politics, Schorsch was able to deliver some deeply needed constructive cricism to his movemnt.

“As opposed to the dense and demanding discourse of scholarship, students crave instant gratification. The way to the heart is not through the circuitous and arduous route of the mind but the rhythmic beat of the drums. …

“The primitiveness of rap and the consumerism of the mall threaten to trivialize the literary culture that is the pride of Judaism. Kitsch has become kosher. A synagogue out of sync is deemed bereft of spirituality. … Our addiction to instant gratification has stripped us of the patience to appreciate any discourse whose rhetoric is dense and demanding. Mindlessly, we grasp for the quick spiritual fix.”

So there you have it. According to the out going head of the flagship institution of Conservative Judaism the leading problem in movmementis...rap music. Which begs the question - where has Schorsch been for the last 30 years? Did he ever leave the confines of JTS? If he had actually spent time in the Conservative hinterland, he would have realized that the movement has produced a generation of somnulent suburban congregations. It is hemorraging members at the edges, while at the same time alienated what should be its next generation of lay leaders to the point that the most vibrant and dynamic communities practicing Conservative Judaism shun the label.


The greatest problem facing Conservative Judaism today is the same one it has struggled with for generations - the disconnect between the elite and mass Conservative Judaism. Elite, or Seminary Conservative Judaism is bosed on a conviction that the proper response to modernity is for Judaism to preserve binding halakha, but to craft a jurisprudence that is critically informed and flexible enough to adapt to modern social change. Mass Conservatism Judaism is based on the desire to attend a service that is mostly in Hebrew and sit next to one's spouse, and a rejection of Orthoodx and Reform Judaism as being either too traditional or not traditional enough (In other words, it is about going to shul 3 days a year, and avoiding corn syrup for 8 days a year, and feeling reassured that at least your rabbi and cantor keep Shabbat and kashrut).


Since Schorsch's diagnosis utterly fails to notice the debilitating ailment of Conservative Judaism, it is not surprising that his prescriptions are way off the mark as well.

In his remarks, the chancellor also lamented the loss of “great scholarship,” which he said has “ceased to energize [the movement] as it had in the past.”

“Once, the polarity of truth and faith at the seminary had made it home for the acme of 20th-century Jewish scholarship, a venue of ferment and fertility,” he said. “Faith once moved us to study our heritage deeply, which truth asked of us that we do it critically, in light of all that we know. Willful ignorance was never an acceptable recourse. The interaction set us apart as the vital center of modern Judaism. But no longer.”

Schorsch may be right that the level of scholarship of JTS has slipped from the Golden Age of Kaplan, Lieberman and Heschel. Improving the scholarship at JTS may be valuable on its own terms, but it does nothing to solve the crippling levels of Jewish illteracy found in most Conservative congregations. Its like arguing that the crisis in American education can be solved if only Harvard cracked down on grade inflation.


The first thing that Conservative Judaism needs to decide is whether it wants to be a mass movement like Reform Judaism or an elite movement like Modern Orthodoxy. There is no place in modern American religion for Conservative Judaism of the past 50 years; one with featured prayerbooks that deliberatley mistranslate prayers, responsa locked safely away at the Seminary, cantors who pray/peform for the congregation and rabbis who abstrusely sermonize rather than teach.


So if you want to be an elite movement, be elite. Feed your core, build from the inside out. Erase the line between clergy and laity by letting lay leaders daven and teach. Above all, do not water things down for the less committed at the expense of the passion of your core. If the moderately affiliated want to flock to less demanding forms of Judaism, let them go; but at least give them a real option. Even if this model was to be done in the most inclusive way possible (a la Hadar) it would still result in a smaller, leaner movement.


But if Conservative Judaism is set on remaining a mass movement, then in needs to start figuring out how to meet the needs of congregants at different levels of knowledge and observance. Right now, the movement takes a schizophrentic approach - at times congregants are assumed to be fully Jewishly literate (e.g. long stretches of old-school davening with explanation) and at times they are assumed to be not only Jewishly illiterate, but also child-like (responsive readings, rabbinic "conducting" of the service. Either you have the ability to read rabinnic sources in the original Hebrew or you can suffice with soundbites from the rabbi.


A Conservative Judaism serious about being a mass movement would stop confusing Hebrew semi-literacy with Hebrew illiteracy, and Hebrew illiteracy with illiteracy. The movement needs to get traditional rabbinnic commentary translated into English(ideally keeping the Hebrew text as well) and into the hands of Conservative Congregants. Certaintly nuances are lost in the translation, but that's what rabbis are for - to point out and explain those nuances. This is not brain science - Art Scroll figured this out years ago. If you a spritual seeker you can now find right-wing interpretations of much of the rabbinic tradition easily available while more nuanced and accurate translations are done ad hoc by Conservative rabbis and educators. If there is no room in the Conservative prayerbook for a full explanation of the structure and meaning of the service, then a companion guide should be created to fit in the pews of every Conservative shul.


Moreover, its a serious mass Conservative Judaism would acknowledge that it is more important to increase congregant observance than it is for every "synagogue-sponsored" event to meet the highest halakhic standards. For example, it is insane to limit a home Shabbat program to just those congregants who actually keep kashrut. Holding out for a seamless web of observance is denying the reality of mass Conservative Judaism


Is it possible for a renewed elite Conservative Judaism and a more populist mass Conservative Judaism? Yes, if, and only if, the movement adopts a multiple congregation synagogue model. Elite Conservative Judaism needs space for lay leaders to lead, to be a room full of passionate participants rather than bar-mitzvah guests; to have a fluid service rather than a permanent learner's service. But these traditional-egalitarian minyans need the institutional resources of synagogues, and the synagogues need their passion and knowledge. The most dynamic Conservative synagogues feed off the passion of in-house minyans. The easiest way to fuse these groups, to bring together core and periphery is music, percussive, melodic music. And so, what Schorsch disdains as a "quick spiritual fix" that threatens to destroy Conservative Judaism might just be the one thing that can save it..

We're In Time Magazine...What Does It Mean

Our little minyan, Kol HaKfar, was recently featured in Time Magazine, in a sidebar on home minyanim that accompanied its feature piece on the home church movement.

Zachary Thacher often spends Friday nights at home in his New York City apartment, but not because he's skipping out on Sabbath-eve prayer services. Thacher, 32, is the founder of Kol haKfar, an independent Jewish community that, like a growing number of similar groups around the country, meets in the homes of community participants. Thacher says he started his group--which now has a Friday-eve attendance of about 25--because "having a meaningful, personal service just didn't seem possible in the harsh lighting and monotonous, institutional vibe of a synagogue."

Like Kol haKfar, many of the new communities thriving in cities across the U.S. are run by volunteers--with a healthy representation in their 20s and 30s--and offer religious services organized almost exclusively by e-mail. The groups tend to avoid denominational classification. At Kol haKfar, for instance, some participants use Orthodox prayer books while others follow along using more liberal Reconstructionist texts.

In all fairness to the beleagured Conservative movement, it shuld be noted that the vast majority of us actually use the Conservative text, Sim Shalom. In in all honesty, our a capella, melodic, traditional egalitarian service is a Conservative Friday night service, or what what one should be. But outside of a very few special congregations, you'd be hard pressed to find the intimacy and spirit of our minyan inside the walls of a Conservative shul.

JEWS FOR W.


The AJC has released a study showing Bush getting more than 31% of the Jewish vote in a potential race with Howard Dean. (Dean 60%, Bush 31%, undecided 9%). The same poll showed similar numbers for Kerry (59-31), Gephardt (60-31) and Clark (59-29), but a higher margin for Lieberman (71-24). To put these numbers in perspective, in the 2000 election, Gore thumped Bush 79-19.


Unlike, say soccer moms or Nascar dad, American Jews are neither sizable (approximately 2.2% of the population), nor generally swing voters. Still, they vote disproportionately (some estimates suggest the Jewish percentage of the electorate is as much as twice the size of the population) and are concentrated almost entirely in the following large states: New York (8.7%), California (2.9%), Florida (3.9%), Illinois (2.2%), Pennsylvania (2.3%), New Jersey (5.7%), Maryland (4.0%) and Massachusetts (4.3%). (Together those states comprise over 3/4 of the American Jewish population while only 2/5 of the total American population).


Since the New Deal, American Jews have been and continue to be one of the most reliably Democratic constituencies in the nation. According to the findings of sociologist Charles Liebman, assimilation and/or prosperity have effectively minimized the gaps between Jews and rest of America on economic issues (although I happen to dispute this, given the fact that Liebman is comparing the relatively well-off Jewish community to the American public at-large, and not others with similar income), but with respect to cultural issues, stand out as left-of-center.


So, given the profile of American Jewry as economic moderates and cultural liberals, its not surprising to see the last two major shifts in Jewish voting patterns, 1) the decline of Democratic dominance in the 70s & 80s with the Republican capture of the suburbs (with Nixon '72, Reagan '80,'84 & Bush '88 getting from 31-39% of the Jewish vote) and the revival of Democratic dominance under in the 90s as part of the coastal professional exodus from the GOP (Bush '92, Dole '96, Bush '00 getting less than 20% of the Jewish vote).


What then to make of the current trend, which shows not only Bush erasing the Democratic gains of the past decade among a group that should be continuing to trend Democrat (after, we're not talking about a group that overlaps too much with NASCAR dads), as well as the jump from 9 to 16% of Jews who identify as Republicans since 2000 (Democratic identification fell from 58% to 51%)?


In the past, Jewish Republicans were pretty much confined to three groups, the first being the Orthodox (especially the Ultra-Orthodox) who rather than being repelled by the cultural conservatism of the GOP, were drawn to it. In addition, Ultra-Orthodox communities resemble groups such as the Mormons to the extent that their own extensive communal social welfare net makes them prefer on the whole lower taxes and less government services. The second group is less affiliated affluent Jews who vote Republican based on pocketbook issues. The third, and historically smallest group were the single-issue Israel hawks who voted with the Republicans out of a belief that the GOP's hard-line in the Cold War would translate into more support for hawkish Israeli policies.


So where is the additional support for Bush coming from? Demographics suggests that the first group is growing, but only by a percent or two. The reality of assimilation is slowly driving an increase in the second group as well, but only marginally. So, the most likely explanation is that the push is coming from the third group - those who base their vote on Israel.


It should be noted that the real hard-liners were already in the GOP camp, either as part the core GOP hawks or as part of the religious camp. So what we are dealing with is the GOP opening up an edge among American Jews with more intense connection to Israel, but whose views are still in the mainstream. There are multiple for this gap, ranging from Bush's clean break from Oslo to Bush's approach to the War on Terror (and the Dems denial that it is a war) which all interlink. More on what this means for Israel, American Jews, and the Democratic party at a later point.

[note: unfortunately, this is not the complete original post, which somehow got garbled when posted to the archive, I've tried to reconstruct it the best I could]