WILL IRAQIS EMBRACE DEFEAT
John Dower, author of Embracing Defeat, the excellent history of the American occupation of post-war Japan, warns in today's Times that that Japan model is a poor fit for a post-Hussein Iraq. In particular, Dower argues that the following factors are currently not in place: 1) international legitimacy of the occupation; 2) legitimacy of the occupation by the vanquished (which was very much aided in Japan by the cooperation of Emperor Hirohito; 3) ethnic & religious homogeneity; 4) the unique charisma of MacArthur; 5) long-term development of post-war policy; 6) commitment to progressive reforms (land, labor, and legal); 7) long-term commitment of significant civil and military manpower; 8) prewar democratic tradition; 9) cooperation of the pre-war local bureaucracy, 10) short-term regional stability; and 11) a lack of natural resources attracting carpetbaggers.
The situation may not be as dire as Dower projects to it be - a number of these factors say less about Iraq and more about Dower's skepticism in the current administration's ability to follow in the footsteps of Truman's visionary post-war planners (e.g. the complaints about the thoroughness of planning, or the logistical requirements, etc.). On the other hand, Dower raises some of the most important challenging facing any post-war Iraq policy - Iraq's artificial birth and lack of unifying figure, the inability to salvage anything useful out of the prior political structure, and the poisioned chalice of oil wealth.
While Dower wishes to emphasize the differences between Japan and Iraq, there is one similarity that can not be overlooked - that now and then the existence of naysayers who believed non-Western people to be culturally incapable of self-government. If the current group of naysayers is to be proved wrong, the challenges Dower identifies need to be at the heart of planning that is already seriously underway for the creation of a successful post-Hussein Iraq.
John Dower, author of Embracing Defeat, the excellent history of the American occupation of post-war Japan, warns in today's Times that that Japan model is a poor fit for a post-Hussein Iraq. In particular, Dower argues that the following factors are currently not in place: 1) international legitimacy of the occupation; 2) legitimacy of the occupation by the vanquished (which was very much aided in Japan by the cooperation of Emperor Hirohito; 3) ethnic & religious homogeneity; 4) the unique charisma of MacArthur; 5) long-term development of post-war policy; 6) commitment to progressive reforms (land, labor, and legal); 7) long-term commitment of significant civil and military manpower; 8) prewar democratic tradition; 9) cooperation of the pre-war local bureaucracy, 10) short-term regional stability; and 11) a lack of natural resources attracting carpetbaggers.
The situation may not be as dire as Dower projects to it be - a number of these factors say less about Iraq and more about Dower's skepticism in the current administration's ability to follow in the footsteps of Truman's visionary post-war planners (e.g. the complaints about the thoroughness of planning, or the logistical requirements, etc.). On the other hand, Dower raises some of the most important challenging facing any post-war Iraq policy - Iraq's artificial birth and lack of unifying figure, the inability to salvage anything useful out of the prior political structure, and the poisioned chalice of oil wealth.
While Dower wishes to emphasize the differences between Japan and Iraq, there is one similarity that can not be overlooked - that now and then the existence of naysayers who believed non-Western people to be culturally incapable of self-government. If the current group of naysayers is to be proved wrong, the challenges Dower identifies need to be at the heart of planning that is already seriously underway for the creation of a successful post-Hussein Iraq.
Labels: Foreign_Policy

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