FOGGY BOTTOM FOG
The tireless Hauser writes in to complain that my latest foreign policy critique has slipped into "mindless Weekly Standard flexing." He notes that two of my concerns - Nation-Building and mediation in South Asia are shared by Dems, the State Department, and liberal critics of the administration and opposed by the Bush administration's hawks ("Weekly Standard's junta faves" in Hauser-speak).
Perhaps I am flexing, but not mindlessly. The State Department has consistently resisted any dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign policy post 9/11. Foggy Bottom counseled restraint in going after the Taliban, caution in provoking the ire of our Arab "allies," hesitancy against Hussein, preservation of Arafat, and putting the means of coalition-building above the ends. It was the State Department that decided to invest massive diplomatic resources on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and give minimal attention to the India-Pakistan conflict. The Bush hawks wanted a hands off policy towards Sharon, it was Foggy Bottom that prodded for U.S. intervention to placate Cairo and Riyadh (or do we already forget the the pointless Powell mission). I shudder to think at some of the internal memos being passed on the South Asian conflict - emphasizing the importance of preserving Musharraf's regime and the need to restrain Indian responses to terror over the more important goal of achieving a definitive break between the Pakistani government and terror.
And while I agree with the neocons on a lot of foreign policy issues, I don't buy into their party line that the Bushies (well at least the hawkish Bushies) can do no wrong, and the Dems can do no right. From day one, the Bushies entered office with a disdainful view towards "nation-building" - rejecting it as part of a Clintonian legacy that had to be jettisoned. For a while, it appeared that this bias would yield in light of the realities of a post-Taliban Afghanistan. It hasn't, and it continues to hamstring the idealist foreign policy goals advocated by the neocons.
The point of my post was the following - on all fronts we are slipping back into the same, comfortable policy patterns that existed before 9/11, with potentially disastrous consequences. With regard to foreign policy, that means a State Department returning to its multilateralist realpolitik autopilot - check with the Europeans, don't meddle in the affairs of anti-democratic so-called allies and above all maintain stability. Well, this policy proved to be an utter failure, for George the Elder as well as for Clinton. And if followed by W., it will prove to be no less a failure. The current stumbling of W. makes it all the more important for the Dems to develop a true foreign policy critique, and not merely ape the ones by the professional diplomats at home and abroad.
The tireless Hauser writes in to complain that my latest foreign policy critique has slipped into "mindless Weekly Standard flexing." He notes that two of my concerns - Nation-Building and mediation in South Asia are shared by Dems, the State Department, and liberal critics of the administration and opposed by the Bush administration's hawks ("Weekly Standard's junta faves" in Hauser-speak).
Perhaps I am flexing, but not mindlessly. The State Department has consistently resisted any dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign policy post 9/11. Foggy Bottom counseled restraint in going after the Taliban, caution in provoking the ire of our Arab "allies," hesitancy against Hussein, preservation of Arafat, and putting the means of coalition-building above the ends. It was the State Department that decided to invest massive diplomatic resources on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and give minimal attention to the India-Pakistan conflict. The Bush hawks wanted a hands off policy towards Sharon, it was Foggy Bottom that prodded for U.S. intervention to placate Cairo and Riyadh (or do we already forget the the pointless Powell mission). I shudder to think at some of the internal memos being passed on the South Asian conflict - emphasizing the importance of preserving Musharraf's regime and the need to restrain Indian responses to terror over the more important goal of achieving a definitive break between the Pakistani government and terror.
And while I agree with the neocons on a lot of foreign policy issues, I don't buy into their party line that the Bushies (well at least the hawkish Bushies) can do no wrong, and the Dems can do no right. From day one, the Bushies entered office with a disdainful view towards "nation-building" - rejecting it as part of a Clintonian legacy that had to be jettisoned. For a while, it appeared that this bias would yield in light of the realities of a post-Taliban Afghanistan. It hasn't, and it continues to hamstring the idealist foreign policy goals advocated by the neocons.
The point of my post was the following - on all fronts we are slipping back into the same, comfortable policy patterns that existed before 9/11, with potentially disastrous consequences. With regard to foreign policy, that means a State Department returning to its multilateralist realpolitik autopilot - check with the Europeans, don't meddle in the affairs of anti-democratic so-called allies and above all maintain stability. Well, this policy proved to be an utter failure, for George the Elder as well as for Clinton. And if followed by W., it will prove to be no less a failure. The current stumbling of W. makes it all the more important for the Dems to develop a true foreign policy critique, and not merely ape the ones by the professional diplomats at home and abroad.
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